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Genesis and Geltung
An Interview with Hans Joas
Tullio Viola and Hans Joas
 Tullio VIOLA – One of the most relevant aspects of your intellectual career is your reflection
on  the  link  between  historical  and  normative  arguments  with  regard  to  values.  This
reflection goes back at least to your 1997 book The Genesis of Values, and may be seen to
culminate  in  the  methodological  chapter  of  your  2011  book  on  The  Sacredness  of  the
Person, in which you talk about the need for an “affirmative genealogy” of values. As you
have made clear many times (most recently in the article “Pragmatismus und Historismus”
in the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie for 2015, published in English in the new volume
“The Timeliness of G. H. Mead” that you yourself edited together with Daniel Huebner), this
historicist argument has many points of contact with pragmatism.
Hans JOAS –  In the debate about  my book The Sacredness  of  the  Person  it  has  been
remarked that the main foundation of my argument – and even the main foundation
for the methodological chapter of the book – is not pragmatism. The main source of
the argument itself is Emile Durkheim’s sociology of religion, which I have applied to
non-religious, mostly secular values; and the main foundation of the methodological
chapter is the Protestant theologian, historian, and sociologist Ernst Troeltsch, and
particularly  his  last  work  Historicism  and  its  Problems.  What  I  think  I  could  show,
however, is,  first,  that there are connections between pragmatism and Troeltsch’s
methodology;  and  second,  that  there  are  connections  between  William  James’
psychology of religion and the fundamental argument coming from Durkheim about
the sacredness of the person. (Actually I even realized that William James in several
passages uses the expression “sacredness of  the individual.”)  So,  in both respects
pragmatism is not the main source of my inspiration here, but something with which
my main sources of inspiration in this book have strong affinities. And the article in
the  Deutsche  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie  that  you  have  mentioned  has  been  written
precisely to demonstrate in detail the connection between American pragmatism and
the most mature version of German historicism, as we find it in Troeltsch.
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Tullio  VIOLA –  However,  your  later  books  seem  to  push  pragmatism  more  into  the
background in comparison with your early work. Is there something specific you could not
find in pragmatism, which has now become more important?
Hans JOAS – When you say that I’m coming from pragmatism, this is of course true in
some sense. But I’m not American and I was not originally trained in America. From
the very outset, my interest in pragmatism was filtered through German historicism.
And  this  is  true  even  in  my  first  book  on  Mead.  As  a  young  man,  I  had  the
(megalomaniac) ambition to write a biography of G. H. Mead in the same sense in
which W. Dilthey had written a biography of Schleiermacher – i.e., to study an author
of the past who, for a reason that you may understand at first only intuitively, is
totally attractive to you, so that you have the feeling you want to read everything
that author has ever written, and you want to understand in detail why that author
changed opinion or attitude at certain points in time, and you want to give a genetic
reconstruction of an author who is totally fascinating to you individually. So, when I
began my research on Mead and found out – here where we are sitting, in the archive
of the then East Berlin University – that Mead had indeed studied with Dilthey, that
fact  had  a  kind  of  “electrical”  importance  for  me.  Not  only  was  Dilthey  the
methodological  role  model  for  my  study  about Mead,  but  there  was  indeed  an
intellectual connection between the two. This connection told me that Mead’s own
move in the direction of a pragmatist philosophy that is oriented toward the social
sciences was already influenced by Dilthey’s historicism. So, as you can see from this
story, I’ve always moved within the tension between pragmatism and historicism,
and I  now feel  to  be at  the point  at  which I  can spell  this  out  more clearly  and
contribute to a possible synthesis of these two great schools of thinking.
 Tullio VIOLA – So let us try to delve a bit deeper into the connections between pragmatism
and what you now call “affirmative genealogy.” One such connection, it seems to me, is the
idea that human action is inherently creative,  as you describe it  in your 1992 book The
Creativity of Action.
Hans JOAS – In my book on creativity I emphasize that every creative process has a
passive  dimension.  To  put  it  bluntly,  you  cannot  find  the  creative  solution  to  a
problem if that solution does not come to you. You can decide that you would like to
solve the problem, but you cannot decide that you will indeed solve the problem! The
inspiration for your creative act has to come from somewhere. Now, when we deal
with the emergence of values, this passive dimension is even stronger. You may not
even have thought about solving a problem in this case; and yet, you are confronted
with  the  attractive  qualities  of  certain  values  –  of  certain  evaluative,  holistic
orientations. And I say “confronted” in the sense that you realize only after the fact
that something in you had already been pre-disposed to accept what has suddenly
come to you. This is something that William James, in his psychology of religious
conversion,  has  described  very  vividly.  But  the  same  is  true  when  no  proper
conversion takes place, and you simply experience an oscillation with regard to your
values:  in some phases of  your life,  your value orientation may somehow lose its
vitality,  or  needs  to  be  revitalized.  That  is  true  for  individuals  and it  is  true  for
collectivities. So, for example, when I write about the abolition of slavery, and about
how important Christian motivations were for that movement in the U.S.,  people
sometimes object that Christianity had been around for a long time,  so it  cannot
simply be Christianity that led to the abolition of slavery. But this is exactly my point:
You  need  a  kind  of  collective  “re-awakening”  (I  take  that  term  from  American
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religious  history),  which  I  call  an  intensification  of  a  motivation  derived  from  a
morality that had already been your morality before.
The notion of “affirmative genealogy,” in turn, refers to the idea that the processes of
the genesis of values – of the emergence of new ideals – in human history are indeed
highly contingent; but that the contingency of the emergence of a value does not
mean  that  the  value  can  only  be  relevant  to  the  people  somehow  immediately
connected to the processes of this emergence. Something comes into the world as a
point of orientation under very contingent circumstances; but can then become a
point of orientation for people who have nothing to do with the cultural, economic,
political processes that led to the emergence of those values. To put it less abstractly,
we could say that – whether we are Christian believers or not – Christianity somehow
emerged  in  a  strange  corner  of  the Roman  Empire,  as  a  sort  of  revolutionary
transformation of Ancient Judaism. But the relevance of Christianity has not been
confined  to  the  Roman  Empire,  or  to  Jews.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  become  an
important source of inspiration for contemporary people, say, in South Korea. Why?
In the process of the emergence of an ideal, something has come into the world that
can develop its  attractive force towards people who have nothing to do with the
conditions of its emergence. So, the objectivity, here, is not an objectivity in the neo-
Kantian sense of  a separate realm of values.  It  is  an objectivity in the sense that
people experience it as going beyond what they can produce by themselves. Already
in my book on The Genesis of Values I referred to Max Scheler’s seemingly paradoxical
expression: ein An-sich für-mich. Scheler’s expression refers to something that I may
experience as indepedent from me, but in the awareness that other people will also
experience other values as true in themselves. This argument, therefore, introduces
an experiential level into the debate about subjectivity versus objectivity.
 Tullio VIOLA – The attempt to conjoin objectivity and contingency may even go back to your
1980 book on Mead, where you make the example of secondary qualities of the world, such
as colors.  On the one hand,  colors are objective;  but on the other,  they are contingent,
because  they  are  not  independent  from  our  constitution  as  bodies  in  the  world.  In
retrospect, this looks like a blueprint for your philosophy of values.
Hans JOAS – Yes, I think that this is indeed the relevance of my interpretation of those
very  long  texts  by  Mead  in  which  he  embarks  on  a  critique  of  empiricism  and
rationalism. They are mostly about the problem of objectivity in the epistemological
sense. But subsequent works on values (think of John Dewey’s Theory of Valuation)
were able to draw a parallel between these epistemological debates and the debate
about the status of valuation.
 Tullio VIOLA – In your 2015 article on pragmatism and historicism, you hint at the possibility
of  conjoining  affirmative  genealogy  with  what  you  call  the  “semiotic  anthropology”  of
certain pragmatists. Could you expand on this point?
Hans JOAS – Indeed, I do think that pragmatism – though not all pragmatists to the
same  extent,  but  certainly  Peirce  and  Mead  –  very  much  emphasized,  in  an
anthropological sense, that the human being is a being that uses signs. And that we
cannot understand the specific way in which human beings relate to the world and to
themselves  if  we  do  not  see  how  these  relationships  are  mediated  through  a
particular type of signs. I think that Peirce was the first to have that idea, and that
James never really understood the epochal importance of that idea. In my current
work,  I  contend that  one of  the weaknesses  of  James’s  theory of  religion is  that,
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although  he  has  such  fantastic  things  to  say  about  the  dynamics  of  religious
experience, he did not understand that he also needed a theory of the articulation of
these religious experiences. And this would have been the systematic place where he
would have had to incorporate a Peircean semiotics into his psychology of religious
experience. Now, I have been aware of that weakness in James since writing my book
on the Genesis of Values, but what I was not aware of back then is that there is another
figure – a close friend of both James’s and Peirce’s – who already realized exactly that
weak  spot  in  James,  and  tried  to  synthesize  Peircean semiotics  with  James’s
psychology  or  phenomenology  of  religious  experience.  And  that  figure  is  Josiah
Royce.
 Tullio VIOLA – Let me go back to an expression you have just used: that of “articulating an
experience.”  This expression pops up rather often in your work.  In particular,  there is  a
passage of your last book in which you pit the articulation of experience against the idea of
a total linguisticization of experience. Now, do you think it is possible to look at the notion of
articulation as a “metaphor of creativity,” in the sense in which you use this notion with
regard to other concepts (such as the concepts of “life,” “production,” “creative intelligence”)
in your book on the creativity of action? I am asking this because it seems to me that it is
the very notion of articulation which allows you to have an open or liberal understanding of
the relation between experience and its conceptualization.
Hans  JOAS –  I  have  never  thought  about  this  with  regard  to  my  “metaphors  of
creativity.” I would have the inclination to say no, and to add that articulation has to
be a component of my fifth metaphor, namely creative intelligence. When you had an
intense  experience,  you  cannot  simply  move  on  without  integrating  it  into  the
interpretive frameworks of your everyday life. And this means that we either have to
reduce the experience to something we have already known, or we have to modify
our interpretive frameworks. This is a real challenge, of course. And it is all the more
a challenge as we do not tackle it in a completely lonely manner. We cannot change
our  interpretive  framework  without  being  asked  by  others:  why  do  you  suddenly
change the way you think about the world? That is the point where Mead’s article
about “Scientific Method and Individual Thinker” would come into the picture. When
I have had a deviant experience – something that deviates from what I expected on
the basis of shared patterns – and I start to articulate that, I do that in a world of
shared symbols (not necessarily in language). And I have to tell others: it is not only
me who has to transform his or her interpretive patterns, but you have to change too.
And I can only do that by producing something that is attractive or convincing to
others.  It  could  be  attractive in  the  sense  of  poetic  expression.  Others  will  then
recognize in my poetic expression that I have articulated an experience that they
have also had, without being able to articulate it. But it could also be convincing in the
sense  that  I  derive  from my experience  a  propositional  statement  about  which I
claim: this  is  closer to the truth than what we have thought so far,  and you are
therefore forced to accept this new description of the world, and can only evade the
force of my argument if you offer me a description that is convincing to me even in
light of the new experience I have had. So, articulation is not an additional metaphor
of creativity, but is an elaboration of what happens intersubjectively when we are in
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Tullio VIOLA – Let me ask you a few questions about your interlocutors. A few decades ago,
especially  in  America,  when  people  started  thinking  seriously  about  the  relationship
between  pragmatism  and  historicism,  there  was  a  prominent  way  of  understanding
pragmatism  that  seems  to  me  very  different  from  yours.  I  am  referring  to  the  neo-
pragmatism of Richard Rorty. How would you describe the differences between Rorty’s and
your own attempts to move pragmatism closer to historicism?
Hans  JOAS –  I  have  to  say immediately  that  I  am  grateful  to  Richard  Rorty:  he
contributed more than anybody else to the renaissance of an interest in American
pragmatism, at least within the U.S. and in the circles of people trained in analytical
philosophy. Rorty did a vast amount for the sake of pragmatism. I also knew him
personally. It was him who approached me when I published my book Pragmatism and
Social Theory. We saw each other on several occasions and I found him an absolutely
brilliant  interlocutor.  So,  I  don’t  want  to  distance  myself  too  sharply  from  him.
However,  there  are  clear  differences  in  our  interpretation  of  pragmatism.  His
understanding of pragmatism is dominated by what he calls “conversation,” and that
is not a typical notion of pragmatism. On the contrary, it is bereft of what would be a
typical pragmatist notion, namely the notion of “inquiry.” To put it in a nutshell: the
pragmatists treated reality as a source of our learning processes, and said that we
encounter the hardness of reality in our action, and while this does not impose on us
an  unambiguous  understanding  of  what  reality  is,  it  certainly  rules  out  certain
understandings of reality. I have to modify my description of the world on the basis
of my encounter with the world.
 Tullio VIOLA – This is what Peirce would have called the “outward clash” of reality…
Hans JOAS – Exactly. And I would say that Rorty’s pragmatism ignores this “outward
clash,” and writes as though we were free to use this or that or another vocabulary
for our description of the world, just in the sense of an arbitrary choice of a liberated
individual.  This,  I  think,  is  both  deeply  un-pragmatist  and  the  source  of  many
problems in Rorty’s philosophy. Now, saying that something is un-pragmatist is not
an argument in itself; it is only an argument if we are talking about whether Rorty’s
is  a  correct  interpretation of  pragmatism or  not.  There  were  many debates  with
Rorty  that  you  can  read  in  printed  form  in  which  Rorty  admitted  that  his
interpretation  of  Dewey  is  not  a  philologically  appropriate  interpretation  of
pragmatism.
Another difference is that Rorty was a militant atheist. Not only a non-believer, but
an atheist in the sense of really thinking that we have to overcome religious faith;
and this is certainly very far from what I am driven by. And I personally think that
some  of  his  interpretations  of  pragmatism  (for  instance  of  William  James)  are
somehow distorted by this militant intention.
 Tullio  VIOLA – You have proposed to locate your  own stance on values and the role  of
genealogy mid-way between Nietzsche and Kant. Do you think we can place Rorty on the
Nietzschean side?
Hans  JOAS –  I  would  say  that  Rorty  has  a  more  Nietzschean  than  pragmatist
understanding of creativity. But he was a democrat like John Dewey, and very far
from  Nietzsche  in  political  respects.  The  way  he  tries  to  combine  a  Nietzschean
understanding  of  creativity  with  a  Deweyan  understanding  of  politics  is  by
privatising the impulses coming from a theory of creativity. As a private individual,
you are free to do what you want, and there should not be a collectively imposed
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morality (this is how he retains the Nietzschean liberation from Christian morality).
At the same time, he avoids the political consequences of Nietzscheanism, as you find
them in the history of the German (or Italian) right, as well as – because of the French
transformation  of  Nietzsche  after  the  second  world  war  –  in  leftist  versions  of
academic  radicalism.  Rorty  was  an outspoken critic  of  this  Nietzschean academic
radicalism. Politically, he was more of a social democrat.
 Tullio VIOLA – The fact remains that he has tried to combine two philosophies – pragmatism
and Nietzscheanism – that might seem hardly reconcilable.
Hans JOAS – There is a certain affinity between Nietzsche and pragmatism, which has
nothing to do with an internal  ambiguity of  pragmatism itself.  At  the end of  the
nineteenth century you have a parallel revolution taking place in different countries
in  the  direction  of  a  reflection  about  creativity.  The  German  version  of  that  is
Nietzsche, together with some followers of Nietzsche, who did not share everything
that  Nietzsche  thought,  such  as  Georg  Simmel.  At  the  same  time,  the  American
pragmatists are the American version of that (I say “American pragmatists” although
there are many differences in the pragmatist “family,” as Richard Bernstein has aptly
put it). And I would add Henri Bergson as the French version of the same movement.
Moreover, I would say that although Bergson and Durkheim are often seen as polar
opposites,  they  also  share  very  much  with  one  another.  Durkheim’s  theory  of
religion, too, is  a version of this general late-nineteenth-century, early-twentieth-
century movement in the direction of an inquiry into the creativity of human action.
So, the fact that people tend to be Nietzschean under the label of pragmatism has
probably more to do with this original affinity.
 Tullio VIOLA – If we now move on to the other extreme of the Nietzsche-Kant polarity, we find
another important interlocutor of yours who has been looking with interest at pragmatism. I
mean, of course, Jürgen Habermas.
Hans JOAS – Habermas and Apel relied on a very selective reception of pragmatism, a
reception that is led by their interest in the logic of the discourse, in the sense of the
processes  of  rational  deliberation  and  argumentation.  Now  this  is  clearly  a
component of both Peirce’s and Mead’s philosophy. (Not so much of James’s, which is
why there is hardly any trace of James in Habermas’s work; and in Apel’s writings
James appears as a sort of second-class thinker, as opposed to the first-class thinker
Peirce – which I think is totally unfair, but comes from the fact that he never had an
affinity for what is important in James.) Both Apel and Habermas use pragmatism to
get away from a monological understanding of reason and to move in the direction of
collective or social processes of rational argumentation. And I’m all with them on
that. But I think that in the work of Peirce, Mead, etc., there is a closer connection
between genesis and validity than you find in Kant or in the Kantianised reception of
pragmatism such as Habermas’s or Apel’s. One can spell out this point on the purely
cognitive level, by saying that Apel and Habermas are mostly interested in how we
justify cognitive validity claims. Peirce, however, was very much interested also in
how we arrive at interesting validity claims that are worth being justified. For Peirce,
the scientific process does not simply depend on the rational justification of validity
claims, but on the emergence of validity claims that lead to experimental practices,
and lead to results that have to be rationally justified. This is a holistic approach,
which  contains  both the  formation  of  creative  hypotheses  and  their  rational
justification. Not every hypothesis is an interesting hypothesis that is worth being
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experimentally tested. If the opposite were the case, you could produce hypotheses
just arbitrarily or randomly. But this is not the case. Human beings need to come to
the conclusion: “this could be the solution to our problem.” In other words, there is
an interaction between the formation of  a  hypothesis  and the processes  through
which we justify the validity claims derived or implicit in this hypothesis. Certainly
for the cognitive level, on which I haven’t elaborated very much. But I think I did
elaborate the internal connection between genesis and validity on the level of values.
 Tullio VIOLA – Another way to characterize your reflections on history against the backdrop
of your interlocutors may be to compare it with the broadly Hegelian ideal – still well alive
today – of a “reconstruction” of the historical past.
Hans JOAS – In fact, the English-speaking world has often brought Hegelianism and
German historicism very closely together. But in the German intellectual history, this
is more of an alternative. The first is a more or less teleological philosophy of history,
the other lays emphasis  on historical  contingency.  And I  side with historicism in
being  very  skeptical  with  regard  to  teleological  outlooks.  Now,  my  idea  of  an
affirmative genealogy of values does have a dimension of “reconstruction,” in that it
says that if I believe in the validity of something today, I cannot avoid retelling history
in  light  of  this  contemporary  validity  claim.  So,  for  instance,  when  I  think  that
human rights are a good thing, I will have to look at history in light of this and ask
who the forerunners of human rights were, who contributed to their genesis, and so
on. But it is important for me to do so without reconstructing history in the sense that
somehow the historical process had to lead to the point where we are now. In other
words, I want to leave open the “implicit futures” of certain historical pasts. Some
readers of The Sacredness of the Person took me to say that there is an ongoing process
of sacralization of the person. Not at all! There are only episodes, and it is a totally
empirical  question,  for  example,  to  ask  to  what  extent  the  nineteenth-century
abolitionists  relied  on  the  eighteenth  century  declarations  of  human  rights.  In
principle, they could have! But often they didn’t. For them, the American document
was  written  in  the  spirit  of  slaveholders.  So  they  didn’t  say:  “the  declaration  of
independence has already proclaimed that all men are created equal, from which we
derive that we have to respect the slaves as equal human beings.” No: they had other
sources. But this is not something I derive from philosophy. You have to derive it
from empirical research. You have to read the abolitionists and see what’s the case.
There is a difference here with Axel Honneth who uses the term “reconstruction.”
And it seems to me that this term in the work of this old German colleague of mine
clearly has teleological implications. People struggle for recognition and something
has to come out of this struggle. To this I answer: no, many struggles just lead to very
negative outcomes for all participants, and no moral progress comes out of that at all.
⁂
 Tullio VIOLA – Let me now go back to The Sacredness of the Person, about which I would like
to raise a possible objection. You often express your skepticism toward the idea that values
can be justified in a purely argumentative manner. But I am worried that this could end up
in an overly strong distinction between “narratives” and “rational accounts.”
Hans JOAS – But that is exactly what I would not want to do! Your objection is similar
to a point recently made by German philosopher Matthias Kettner, who has in a very
intelligent and constructive manner criticized my conception of rational discourse.1
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And I have replied to Kettner by making the following point, which I take to express a
deeply  pragmatist  attitude.  When  we  realize  that  we  disagree  in  our  evaluative
judgments, the next step has, of course, to be rational argument. I have to tell you
why, starting from something that we share, you derive a judgment that seems to me
to be inconsistent with our shared foundations. And you may in turn try to show me
why you are  consistent,  and I  am not.  This  is  a  purely  rational  argument.  But  it
presupposes that we do share certain things. Maybe, we share our belief in the ten
commandments; or in Kant’s moral philosophy. If this is the case, we have a common
basis  and  we  can  go  on  to  argue  in  a  purely  rational  way  about  what  follows
normatively from our common basis. Now the pragmatist would say: this is good in
most  cases.  That is,  in most  cases there is  no need for  narration and affirmative
genealogy, because there is space for rational argumentation. What happens, though,
when we discover that we do not share either our belief in the ten commandments or
our belief in Kant’s moral philosophy, or in short, that we do not share anything? Let
us imagine that I have a debate with somebody who belongs to the NSU – the German
right-wing extremists who killed at least ten Turkish immigrants. These are people
who are as far from my moral intuitions as possible. You could say that in this case
nothing helps,  that these people are just enemies.  And politically,  that’s probably
true. We have to arrest these people and I do not get the feeling that talking to them
could modify my opinions. But as a matter of principle (although perhaps not in the
empirical reality), I feel obliged to do as much as I can to understand what drove
children who grew up in Thuringia to become anti-immigrant terrorists. I therefore
imagine that it  should be possible to enter into a process of communication with
them.  And  this  communication  cannot  be  restricted  to  rational  argumentation.  I
would have to tell the other person that I realize we are so far from each other that
we seem not to share anything in moral respect. “You believe in the superiority of
the Aryan race” – I could say, – “and I find this belief not only completely unjustified
on the cognitive side, but also normatively abominable. So, tell me: how have you
come to that? What happened to you, biographically? If, for instance, this was not
already the worldview of your parents, you must have had some act of conversion to
a neo-nazi conviction.” In turn, the other person will  have the right to ask me a
similar question: to ask me why I do not see the “obvious” superiority of the Aryan
race. That is the point where narration comes into the picture. So, I am not saying:
let’s replace rational argumentation with narration. What I am saying is: let’s enlarge
the scope of human communication beyond the limits of rational argumentation. And
beyond these limits there is not only the possible clash of worldviews, but there is the
possibility to talk to each other (at least, in principle), and when we talk to each other
in a narrative way, we can use autobiographical, historical, or mythical narration.
And  then  we  may find  out  that  we  do  share  certain  things.  I  may,  for  instance,
understand what happened to you that made you convert to a neo-nazi worldview,
and although I would say “no, that’s still the wrongest possible direction you could
have taken in that situation!,” I understand better now that you are a human being
like me, and that I have to understand what makes you go in this terrible direction.
So, I do not contrast narration and rational argument, but I use certain structures of
narration  to  go  beyond  the  merely  rational-argumentative  form  of  rational
argumentation into something more comprehensive.
 Tullio VIOLA – Your book aims to be both a scholarly account of the genealogy of human
rights, and a meta-theoretical reflection on how such genealogies may affect the public. My
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question, then, is the following: empirically, what do you think is the difference between a
situation  in  which  discussions  about  values  are  sustained  by  books  like  yours  (i.e.,
scientifically  informed accounts)  and  a  situation  in  which  the  affirmative  genealogy  of
values is articulated by non-scientific means, such as journalism, art, political discourse,
and everyday life? Is there a qualitative difference between these two levels, or can we think
of a continuous spectrum?
Hans JOAS – I could give a long answer by saying that mankind was deeply steeped in
narration until  the Axial  Age.  Up to  that  point,  the justification of  values passed
through mythical stories. Then, a kind of critical distance toward mythical narratives
emerged.  The question arose:  is  this  story you are telling me a real  story,  or did
somebody make it up? Can I improve this story by looking at facts independently
from the story I  have been told?  As  of  that  moment,  there is  a  tension between
narration and the rational criteria that makes us critical narrators. Historians do not
simply  tell  a  mythical  story, but  claim that  what  they are  saying is  a  true  story.
However, after that innovative introduction of a kind of theoretical distance from
mythical stories,  myths do not die out.  But books like mine make the claim that,
although there are many narrations of the genesis of human rights, many of them
simply cannot be defended. It is simply not true, for instance, that human rights have
developed only in the West. Let’s look at the facts; but we also have to reintegrate all
these  facts  into  a  new  story.  Now,  for  me  the  result  of  the  critique  of  certain
narrations cannot be – as some historians have claimed in Germany over the last
decades – “let’s give up on narration.” Rather, we have to rethink the fundamental
structure of narration. So, my problem in the book was to integrate three levels: the
given conventional  histories,  the fundamental  structure of  an alternative history,
and the methodological reflection on this process.
⁂
 Tullio VIOLA – Is it possible to enlarge your reflections on Genesis and Geltung beyond the
scope  of  a  philosophy  of  values?  I  think,  for  instance,  that  there  are  strong  affinities
between your philosophy of values and your predilection for a historical contextualization
of philosophical accounts.
Hans JOAS – I share your interpretation. I wrote a biographical work on Mead at a time
in  which  among  German  historians  it  was  extremely  unfashionable  to  write  a
biography. Biography was seen as over-estimating the role of individuals (whereas
sociologists  were  supposed  to  study  much  wider  processes  of  collective
transformation) or simply naive, because if we are interested in social sciences, what
counts  is  the  social  scientific  explanation  as  such,  and  not  the  way  some  social
scientists have found that explanation. Even today, the typical attitude of sociologists
is: let’s take interesting hypotheses, let’s tear them out of the work of a given writer,
and then let’s put them to a test. I was intuitively against this attitude, for at least
two reasons. The first is  that I  do not think that interesting cognitive statements
come in such isolated form. A more holistic approach is more appropriate. Secondly,
you  understand  even  a  cognitive  validity  claim  better  when  you  study  it  in
connection with the genesis  of  this  cognitive validity claim. Why did that author
make that claim? All thinkers have interlocutors, and therefore emphasize something
because they are influenced by other thinkers,  or because they are struggling for
independence  from  those  thinkers,  and  so  on.  People  like  Quentin  Skinner  have
elaborated on this idea, and although I do not share all Skinner said, I think this is
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true  (morever,  it  is  also  a  fundamental  historicist  assumption  in  the  study  of
intellectual history).
In the history of science, this emphasis on holism has been developed under the label
of  “paradigms.”  Now  if  we  follow  Thomas  Kuhn,  paradigms  are  not  exclusively
cognitive, but they contain values. And this means that although it is true that an
isolated cognitive statement can be tested empirically, totally irrespective of who the
speaker is (or of what her or his motivations were), paradigms cannot be evaluated
like that. So, the bridge between my affirmative genealogy and the cognitive question
is, I think, the evaluative dimension of major cognitive frameworks. And this is even
a bridge to the history of science. When we try to reconstruct the history of science
and its fundamental transformations, it is not sufficient to look at the falsification of
isolated  cognitive  statements.  The  transformations  in  the  history  of  science  bear
clear similarities to conversion processes in individual biographies or in collective
changes, in that a new paradigm is seen as more attractive, more satisfying, more
fulfilling than the other.
 Tullio VIOLA – Alongside your interest in the history of ideas, part of your work certainly falls
under the category of historical sociology. I am thinking for instance of your book Kriege
und  Werte.  Studien  zur  Gewaltgeschichte  des  20.  Jahrhunderts (2000)  (English:  War  and
Modernity, 2003). Would you say that pragmatism has played a role there too?
Hans JOAS – I would certainly suscribe to the label “historical sociology,” although I
am moving between several disciplines. But I am not doing so as an act of arbitrary
choice.  Rather,  I  feel  that  I  cannot deal  adequately with the problems I  have if  I
confine myself to only one discipline. Already at this level, however, I think you could
say that this is a pragmatist attitude, because there is a priority of the problem. And
problems do not come in disciplinary forms. I see the system of scholarly disciplines
as a pragmatic form of the division of labour which we should adhere to if it’s good
for  the  solution  of  problems.  But  if  the  solution  of  certain  problems  asks  us  to
transcend disciplinary boundaries,  then we clearly have to do so.  So,  I  do indeed
write again and again about the history of philosophy, but my work is always driven
by certain systematic questions related to historical sociology that necessarily drive
me to take seriously the contribution of non-sociological thinkers as well. So, I have a
feeling that I remain a pragmatist even when I do not talk about pragmatism.
NOTES
1. Matthias Kettner (2014), “Affirmative Genealogie und argumentativer Diskurs. Ein Vergleich
im Anschluss  an Hans  Joas,”  in Hermann-Josef  Große Kracht  (ed.),  Der  moderne  Glaube  an  die
Menschenwürde. Philosophie, Soziologie und Theologie im Gespräch mit Hans Joas, Bielefeld.
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